



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








LO2 PREVALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ HA] [ HA] [ HA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT SHEET #5000 LISTED 72 DIODES. THIS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN 66 DIODES. DELETE 6 DIODES. SIX REMAINING
DIODES ASSESSED ON THIS SHEET WERE MISCOUNTED.





NASA FMEA #: 2184-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 MAINSTAGE MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE
MAINSTAGE COMMANDS ARE NOT INSTRUMENTED. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. NASA REVISED THEIR
FUNCTION AND SCREEN CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2187-1
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2189-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. SHORT IN SWITCH CIRCUIT, PASSED
ON THROUGH THE SHORTED BLOCKING DIODE, WOULD REMOVE THE INHIBIT
FROM THE HYBRID DRIVER. THIS DECREASE IN REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT
IN PREMATURE CLOSING OF LO2 PREVALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 2191-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REM_:
12 SWITCH CLOSE GROUND DIODES.





FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY





NASA FMEA #: 2191-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 SWITCH CLOSE GROUND DIODES. DIODES FAIL SHORTED WILL NOT
NORMALLY AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE CIRCUIT.





NASA FMEA #: 2192-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 SWITCH OPEN GROUND DIODES.
BY LIKE AND UNLIKE RSDUNDANCY.
MASKS THE FAILURE.
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED
FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5000
L02 PREVALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 SWITCH OPEN GROUND DIODES. DIODES FAIL SHORTED WILL NOT
NORMALLY AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE CIRCUIT.





NASA FMEA #: 2193-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODES. DIODE FAILURE WILL NOT NORMALLY
AFFECT THE CIRCUIT OPERATION.





NASA FMEA #: 2193-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 ZENER TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODES. DIODE FAILURE WILL NOT
NORMALLY AFFECT THE CIRCUIT OPERATION.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




48 INSTRUMENTATION RESISTORS. LOSS OF THE MEASUREMENT ON THE
TELEMETRY DOWNLINK.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES. DIODE FAILS OPEN. LOSS OF THE
MEASUREMENT ON THE TELEMETRY DOWN LINK.





NASA FMEA #: 2195-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES. DIODE SHORTS. FAILS B-SCREEN
BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE. LOSS OF MANUAL SWITCH
CLOSE COMMAND ISSOLATION. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY
LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5000
LO2 PREVALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. DIODE FAILS OPEN. LOSS OF THE
MEASUREMENT ON THE TELEMETRY DOWN LINK.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. DIODE SHORTS. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE
REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE. LOSS OF MANUAL SWITCH OPEN COMMAND
ISSOLATION. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY.














COMPARE [ / ]
EPD_C/XPS
5000
LO2 PREVALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




30 BLEED RESISTORS. POSSIBLE ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENT ON THE
TELEMETRY DOWNLINK.





NASA FMEA #: 2390-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE__
3 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. DIODE SHORTS.
DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.


























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
IF] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES. DIODE SHORTS. FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE.
FAILS B-



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




3 TOGGLE SWITCHES. INADVERTENT COMMAND TO REOPEN PREVALVE DURING
MECO SEQUENCE. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE.











LO2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




3 TOGGLE SWITCHES. INADVERTENT COMMAND TO CLOSE SOLENOID, MAY
CLOSE PREVALVE PREMATURELY DURING THE BURN. ONE SWITCH SCAN
MEASUREMENT FOR 4 SWITCH CONTACTS DOES NOT SATISFY THE B-SCREEN.
FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




12 FUSES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND MANUAL) IN
LO2 PREVALVE COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE THE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCE NSTS 22206, PARA 2.3.3.C, AND ASSESSMENT MPS-4160
REMARKS.
THE














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ NA] [ HA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




12 FUSES. OPEN FUSES REMOVE POWER FROM THE LO2 PREVALVE CONTROL
SWITCH. OPEN SWITCH INITIATES REDUNDANT ON-ORBIT VACUUM VENTING
FUNCTION AFTER MECO. VENTING FUNCTION NOT CRITICAL FOR MISSION.
REFERENCE ASSESSEMENT MPS-4150 REMARKS.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-I,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-I,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.







MPS-5013 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-I,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-I,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.







MPS-5015 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-1,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.







MPS-5016 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-I,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-I,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-I,
CRITICALITY 2/IR, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.





NASA FMEA # : NA
NASA DAT:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-2,
CRITICALITY I/i, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-2,
CRITICALITY I/I, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ g /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-2,
CRITICALITY i/I, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.







MPS-5022 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 MDM. REFERENCE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FMEA 05-5-B03-I-2,
CRITICALITY i/i, LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM AFT MDM'S FAI-4.












MPS-5031 BASELINE [ ]
2078-2 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5031
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN HDC IIIs. B-SCREEN FAILS BECAUSE OF SERIES/PARALLEL
REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED
BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5032 BASELINE [ ]
2078-1 NEW [ X ]
COSPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5032




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [







6 OPEN HDC IIIs. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANT (PARALLEL)
DRIVER MASKS THE FAILURE.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3 OPEN HDC Is.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2076-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (2 PER CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :

















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5041
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 CLOSE HDC IIIs. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2075-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




3 CLOSE HDC I'S. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.












MPS-5043 BASELINE [ ]
2072-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5043
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDWlFUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 CLOSE RPC'S. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5044 BASELINE [ ]
2o_3-1 NEw [ x ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5044




[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
6 CLOSE RPC OUTPUT DIODES.




FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5051
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] C N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 CLOSE HDC III'S. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY..





NASA FMEA #: 2072-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 CLOSE RPCIS. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
6 CLOSE RPC OUTPUT DIODES.




FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN HDC III'S. B-SCREEN FAILS BECAUSE OF SERIES/PARALLEL
REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURES. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED
BY LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.












MPS-5062 BASELINE [ ]
2o78-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5062
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN HDC III'S. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANT (PARALLEL)
DRIVER MASKS THE FAILURE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN RPC OUTPUT DIODES.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2182-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 2180-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY
MASKS THE FAILURE. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5071B BASELINE [ ]
2185-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/NPS
5071
DIODE (10 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. DIODE FAIL OPEN WILL INHIBIT
MAUAL CAPABILITY TO OPEN PREVALE AFTER MECO. FEEDLINE VENTING
NOT CRITICAL AFTER MECO. REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MPS-4150 REMARKS.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5071C BASELINE [ ]
2187-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5071
DIODE (10 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [F] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN OPENING THE LO2 PREVALVE AFTER MECO. FEEDLINE VENTING
NOT CRITICAL. REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MPS-4150 REMARKS. FAILS B-
SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE.












MPS-5072 BASELINE [ ]
2180-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5072
DIODE (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




6 OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY
MASKS THE FAILURE. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2185-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. DIODE FAIL OPEN WILL INHIBIT
MANUAL CAPABILITY OF OPENING PREVALVE AFTER MECO. FAILS B-SCREEN
BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE. AFTER MECO, FEEDLINE
VENTING NOT CRITICAL. REFERANCE ASSESSMENT MPS-4150 REMARKS.





NASA FMEA #: 2182-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




9 OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2187-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD DELETE)




6 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN OPENING THE L02 PREVALVE AFTER MECO. FEEDLINE VENTING
NOT CRITICAL. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE. REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MPS- 4150.





NASA FMEA #: 2183-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




9 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
C ]

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY
MASKS THE FAILURE. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 MAINSTAGE MDM BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2186-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




6 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN CLOSING THE LO2 PREVALVE COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5074D BASELINE [ ]
2189-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5074
DIODE (I0 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [F] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. THE DIODE FAILING OPEN, AND
FAILURES IN THE CLOSE SOLENOID CIRCUITS COULD INHIBIT THE OPENING
OF THE PREVAVES AFTER MECO. OPENING OF THE PREVALVES TO VENT THE
FEEDLINE IS NOT CRITICAL BECAUSE OF LEAKAGE THROUGH ENGINE.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MPS-4150 REMARKS.





NASA FMEA #: 2188-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (10 PER CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




6 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN CLOSING THE LO2 PREVALVE COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] C ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY
MASKS THE FAILURE. FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DETERMINED BY LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2186-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




6 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN CLOSING THE LO2 PREVALVE COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




9 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2184-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
CONPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 MAINSTAGE MDM BLOCK DIODES.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2188-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




6 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND
MANUAL) IN CLOSING THE L02 PREVALVE COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5076C BASELINE [ ]
2189-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5076
DIODE (7 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




6 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. THE DIODE FAILING OPEN, AND
FAILURES IN THE CLOSE SOLENOID CIRCUITS COULD INHIBIT THE OPENING
OF THE PREVALVES AFTER MECO. OPENING OF THE PREVALVES TO VENT
THE FEEDLINE IS NOT CRITICAL BECAUSE OF LEAKAGE THROUGH ENGINE.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MPS-4150 REMARKS.





NASA FMEA #: 2012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5120
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CONTROL
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




3 CLOSE SW SCAN DIODES. THE FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY BY TYING
PARALLEL PATHS TOGETHER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN
A RUPTURE OF THE MPS. THE BLOCKING PROTECTION IS NOT STANDBY
REDUNDANT AND IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2237-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2 OPEN SW SCAN DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2 OPEN SW SCAN DIODES. THE FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY BY
CONNECTING PARALLEL PATHS TOGETHER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
RESULT IN A RUPTURE OF THE MPS. THE BLOCKING PROTECTION IS NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT AND IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2014-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 2015-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE WERE 3 DIODES TOO MANY ON THE MDAC ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 5120.
DELETE 3 DIODES FROM WORKSHEET 5120.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ],
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT INDICATES THAT
A PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS WOULD ACTIVATE THE HELIUM CLOSING
SOLENOID LV24. THIS WOULD CLOSE THE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE.
HOWEVER, A PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS ON THE TOGGLE SWITCH WOULD
INHIBIT THE GPC'S CLOSE COMMAND, DEACTIVATE THE LV24 SOLENOID,
AND OPEN THE SHUTOFF VALVE.





NASA FMEA #: 2011-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE SWITCH IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT SYSTEM.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /IR ] C P ] C NA] C P ]
IOA C 3 /2R ] C P ] C P ] C P 3
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY i.





NASA FMEA #: 2017-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY I.





NASA FMEA #: 2017-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ePD_C/MPS
5126




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY I.











NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5127





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT CLOSE (PVT).
[ ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MPS-5128
2040-2
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5128




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT CLOSE (PV7).
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2040-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT CLOSE (PVT)
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2040-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY I.





NASA FMEA #: 2040-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY I.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CLOSE (PV7). THIS COULD CAUSE A
RUPTURE IN THE MPS DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION. THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE.







MPS-5133 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL OPEN THE VALVE PREMATURELY.
COULD BE RELEASED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE.
O2













NEW [ X ]
_ITI_LITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CLOSE (PV7) . THIS COULD CAUSE A
RUPTURE IN THE MPS DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION. THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE.









LEAD ANALYST : HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL OPEN THE VALVE PREMATURELY.
COULD BE RELEASED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE.
O2











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CLOSE (PV7). THIS COULD CAUSE A
RUPTURE IN THE MPS DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION. THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE.







MPS-5137 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL OPEN THE VALVE PREMATURELY.
COULD BE RELEASED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE.
02

















NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2 BLOCKING DIODES, MDM TO RPC. VENTING 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS
CRITICALITY i.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE ELIMINATES THE ABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE VALVE.
COULD BE VENTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS READILY
DETECTABLE.
02











DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 RPC A OUTPUT DIODE, 12A. THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE
IS CRITICALITY I. THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.











DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ASSESSMENT IS FOR TWO DIODES.




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE
THE BLOCKING PROTECTION IS NOT





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE ELIMINATES THE ABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE VALVE. 02
COULD BE VENTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE.


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY i.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY i.


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY i.

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY i.


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY I.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
C ]
C ]

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODE. A SHORT IN THIS DIODE COULD GROUND
THE OUTPUT TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST. 02
COULD BE VENTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2162-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE: MPS/EPD&C FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
PREMATURE TRANSFER TO START COULD VENT PROPELLANT OVERBOARD
DURING BOOST. THIS COULD RESULT IN FIRE/EXPLOSION.
DOCUMENTATION ON ANY SOFTWARE INHIBIT WAS UNAVAILABLE.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5142
L02 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE TOGGLE SWITCH
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE: MPS/EPD&C FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
THE FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED DURING MPS DUMP. DIRECT INSERTION
MISSION IS THE MOST CRITICAL CASE SINCE IT REQUIRES A MANUAL DUMP
INITIATE COMMAND.





NASA FMEA #: 2160-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE: MPS/EPD&C FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
THE FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED DURING MPS DUMP (WHEN S1 IS NOT IN
GPC POSITION). DIRECT INSERTION MISSION IS THE MOST CRITICAL
CASE SINCE IT REQUIRES A MANUAL DUMP INITIATE COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ONE FUSE, ONLY ELIMINATES ONE POWER PATH.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2357B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF DIODE ERODES REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE - (INADVERTENT
CLOSE COMMAND) WOULD ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID POWER. THIRD
FAILURE - (INADVERTENT CLOSE POWER) WOULD SHUT VALVE DURING
LOADING.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ IN ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FIRST FAILURE WOULD ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID INHIBIT. SECOND
FAILURE - INADVERTENT OPEN COMMAND. THIRD FAILURE - LOSS OF
CLOSE SOLENOID POER CAUSING PREMATURE OPENING OF THE OUTBOARD
F/D.





NASA FMEA #: 2358B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




1 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE. A SHORT IN THIS DIODE COMBINED
WITH AN INTERNAL HDC FAILURE WOULD GROUND THE OPEN SOLENOID.
INADVERTENT CLOSE SOLENOID POWER WOULD CLOSE THE VALVE DURING
LOADING. THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5160E BASELINE [ ]
2360B-I NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5160




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 2372B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2055B-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA SCENARIO IS DIFFERENT AND MORE CRITICAL THAN IOA's.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5163 BASELINE [ ]
2055B-I NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5163




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















MPS-5164 BASELINE [ ]
2055B-4 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5164
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C N / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID POWER. PREMATURE
OUTPUT BY CLOSE SOLENOID HDC WOULD CLOSE OUTOBARD F/D VALVE.
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [






LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.












MPS-5167 BASELINE [ ]
2057B-2 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5167
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5168



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























_DW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS SCREEN B ON THE GROUND DUE TO GROUND OPEN COMMAND MASK.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AN OPEN DURING LOADING WOULD NOT BE DETECTED.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS FOUND A MORE CRITICAL SCENARIO.
[ ]
[ ]











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF PROPELLANT COMBINED WITH ACCELERATION LOADS COULD RUPTURE
THE F/D LINE CAUSING A FIRE HAZARD.
















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /1R ] C P ] [ P ] C P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA SCENARIO IS POSSIBLE.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA SCENARIO IS POSSIBLE.
[ ]
[ ]
















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C






























[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5500 BASELINE [ ]
2280-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5500




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2280-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P] [ F] [ P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING PROTECTION. A SECOND FAILURE
WILL NOT ACTUATE THE VALVE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5500B BASELINE [ ]
2289-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5500




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2290-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 13 ]
IOA [ 3 13 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5500




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COXPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5501
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




PREMATURE OPENING OF THE FILL DRAIN IS ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF ONE OR MORE SSME's. (FAIL SHORTED TO
BUS) DIFFERENT FROM NASA's FAIL XFER TO CLOSE.












MPS-5502 BASELINE [ ]
2037-3 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5502
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / .] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER THIS FAILURE, A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND B COULD OPEN FILL
DRAIN VALVE. NASA SCENARIO POSSIBLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2037-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA SCENARIO IS MORE CRITICAL.
[ ]
C ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /" ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL RESULT IN ADVERTENT POWER TO CLOSE SOLENOID AND
TERMINATION OF POWER TO OPEN SOLENOID WITH ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE
(LOSS OF GND OPEN COMMAND).





NASA FMEA #: 2037-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5506 BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) MANUAL OPEN
COMMAND, i.e. VACUUM INERT USING F/D VALVE.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COHPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV31). THE INBOARD FILL DRAIN WILL OPEN IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
LOST. MINIMUM OF 2 MORE FAILURES TO CAUSE CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON
ONE OR MORE SSME's AND POSSIBLE FIRE AND EXPLOSION.





NASA FMEA #: 2053-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL GIVE PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO HDC IN SERIES WITH
OPEN SOLENOID. REDUNDANCY WILL BE REDUCED 2 ADDITIONAL FAILURES
NECESSARY FOR LOSS OF VEHICLE. (OTHER SERIES HDC MUST CONDUCT
AND TERMINATION OF POWER TO CLOSE SOLENOID).












MPS-5512 BASELINE [ ]
2053-2 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5512
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FAILURE WILL GIVE PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO HDC IN SERIES WITH
OPEN SOLENOID. REDUNDANCY WILL BE REDUCED. TWO ADDITIONAL
FAILURES ARE NECESSARY FOR LOSS OF VEHICLE. PREMATURE OPEN
COMMAND FROM NEXT SERIES HDC AND TERMINATION OF POWER TO CLOSE
SOLENOID.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MPS-5513
2053-1
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5513



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MPS-5515
2059-2
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5515



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




PREMATURE OPEN CMD A. AFTER AT LEAST 2 FAILURES THE FILL DRAIN
VALVE COULD OPEN PREMATURELY.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PREMATURE OPEN CMD B. SECOND FAILURE COULD APPLY POWER TO OPEN
SOLENOID. THIRD FAILURE TERMINATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID POWER
WOULD OPEN F/D VALVE.


















[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL TERMINATE GROUND OPEN SIGNAL. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE PREMATURE CLOSURE OF F/D VALVE.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDNACY WILL CAUSE
CLOSURE OF F/D VALVE.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE WILL GIVE PREMATURE CLOSE COMMAND (ERODE REDUNDANCY).
THE INBOARD F/D WILL CLOSE IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.







MPS-5526 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL INHIBIT CLOSE COMMAND (ERODE REDUNDANCY). THE
INBOARD F/D WILL OPEN IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR ONE DIODE. REDUNDANCY WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP VALVE
OPEN. MINIMUM OF 2 ADDITIONAL FAILURES NEED FOR PREMATURE
CLOSURE (LOSS OF MDM OPENS AND PREMATURE CLOSE SOLENOID
ACTIVATION).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2282-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5532








HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ / ] [ ] [N] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2284-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5532





HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COXPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PARALLEL PATH WILL MASK FAILURE.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2285-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5532






NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO OPEN SOLENOID. PREMATURE
ACTUATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID WOULD CLOSE F/D DURING LOADING.





NASA FMEA #: 2286-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5533
ITEM: DIODES (2) (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




INBOARD FILL DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL OPEN IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
LOST. GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSME's.





NASA FMEA #: 2287-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5533






NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /" ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FIRST FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF POWER TO CLOSE SOLENOID. SECOND
FAILURE (PREMATURE ACTUATION OF OPEN SOLENOID) COULD RESULT IN
PREMATURE F/D OPEN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2097-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2 RPC MONITOR RESISTORS.
[ ]
[ ]















MPS-5550A BASELINE [ ]
2386-1 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMP_ [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5550




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FME #: 2387-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2090-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PARALLEL PATH MASKS THE FAILURE.
[ ]
[ ]











HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MPS-5553
2091-1
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5553























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PARALLEL PATH MASKS THE FAILURE.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2092-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]














NASA FMEA #: 2092-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PARALLEL PATH MASKS THE FAILURE.
[ ]
C ]














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PARALLEL PATH MASKS THE FAILURE.
C ]
[ ]











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT OPEN THE VALVE DUE TO A REDUNDANT
PATH. FAILURE IN THE SECOND PATH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT OPEN THE VALVE DUE TO A REDUNDANT
PATH. FAILURE IN THE SECOND PATH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
_ITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT OPEN THE VALVE DUE TO A REDUNDANT
PATH. FAILURE IN THE SECOND PATH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ i /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT OPEN THE VALVE DUE TO A REDUNDANT
PATH. FAILURE IN THE SECOND PATH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]







COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ HA] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [







THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT OPEN THE VALVE DUE TO A REDUNDANT
PATH. FAILURE IN THE SECOND PATH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL NOT OPEN THE VALVE DUE TO A REDUNDANT
PATH. FAILURE IN THE SECOND PATH COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF VEHICLE.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ 1 [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A SHORT IN THE DIODE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY. A SECOND SHORTED
DIODE WITHIN THE SERIES HDC I WILL GROUND THE OUTPUT AND OPEN THE
VALVE.
















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2411-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2411-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/88.
NASA VIOLATES NTS 22206 2.3.3 F.





NASA FMEA #: 2412-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] Ix]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/88.
NASA VIOLATES NTS 22206 2.3.3 F.





NASA FMEA #: 2413-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/88.
NASA VIOLATES NTS 22206 2.3.3 F.





NASA FMEA #: 2416-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5650
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]
[ HA] [ HA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




6 BLOCKING DIODES (XDUCER SEL).
A SECOND FAILURE WILL NOT OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET, BUT A THIRD
FAILURE COULD CAUSE ET OVERPRESSURIZATION.





NASA FMEA #: 2034-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




6 BLOCKING DIODES (XDUCER SEL).
A SECOND FAILURE WILL NOT OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET, BUT A THIRD
FAILURE COULD CAUSE ET OVERPRESSURIZATION.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5651




[ P ] C P ]
CP] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 2063-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SECOND AILURE COULD CAUSE LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE IN THE ET AND
CAUSE IMPLOSION DUE TO FLIGHT LOADS.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5653




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SECOND FAILURE COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE&a3600HET.
[ ]
[ ]












MPS-5654 BASELINE [ ]
2063-2 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5654
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (i PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE IN THE ET AND






NASA FMEA #: 2385-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 200400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2225-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE IS READILY DETECTABLE. ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE;
MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)




PREMATURE OFF CREATES THE FALSE OPEN COMMAND.
[ ]
[ ]
















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PREMATURE OFF CREATES THE FALSE OPEN COMMAND.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PREMATURE OFF CREATES THE FALSE OPEN COMMAND.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















MPS-5750 BASELINE [ ]
2252-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ HA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE DIODE, PLUS A
SHORT IN THE ON INTERNAL HDC DIODE, WILL GROUND A SOLENOID.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 DIODE OP RPC "B" OUT (12A). FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF OPEN
COMMAND B. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL LEAD TO THE LOSS OF OPEN
SOLENOID POWER AND POSSIBLE PREMATURE VALVE CLOSURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2248-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




1 DIODE OP RPC "B" OUT (12A). FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF
REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION. SECOND FAILURE (SERIES RPC
BLOCKING DIODE SHORTS) RESULTS IN PARALLEL RPC HAVING ITS OUTPUT
TIED TO GROUND. CURRENT LIMIT WILL TRIP RPC ELIMINATING POWER TO
OPEN
SOLENOID. PREMATURE CLOSE IS POSSIBLE. PARALLEL PATH MASKS
FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2248-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[ 3 /3 ] [ HA] [ HA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 DIODE OP RPC "B" OUT (12A). P-TERMINAL OF THE DIODE SHORTED TO
GROUND. THIS WOULD ELIMINATE A REDUNDANT PATH FOR OPEN SOLENOID
POWER.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5750D BASELINE [ ]
2250-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 DIODE OP XOVER (12A). LOSS OF VEHICLE IS A POSSIBILITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2250-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




1 DIODE OP XOVER (12A). LOSS OF VEHICLE IS A POSSIBILITY.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5750F BASELINE [ ]
2250-3 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 DIODE OP XOVER (12A). FAILURE CAN SHORT ALL OPEN COMMANDS TO
GROUND, VENTING OPEN PRESSURE AND ALLOWING VALVE TO CLOSE DURING
MAIN ENGINE BURN. BISTABLE FEATURE AND LATCH PROVIDE REDUNDANCY
AGAINST PREMATURE CLOSURE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5750H BASELINE [ ]
2253-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5750G BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 RESISTOR OF POS SW MONITOR. REFERENCE: FMEA 05-67-200900-1





NASA FMEA #: 2255-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 RESISTOR CL POS SW MONITOR. LOSS OF MONITORING REDUNDANCY.
ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE; MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B C
[ P ] C F ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :





LOSS OF VEHICLE IS A POSSIBILITY.







MPS-5750L BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




1 DIODE OP RPC "C" OUT (12A). FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF
REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION. SECONE FAILURE (SERIES RPC
BLOCKING DIODE SHORTS) RESULTS IN PARALLEL RPC HAVING ITS OUTPUT
TIED TO GROUND. CURRENT LIMIT WILL TRIP RPC, ELIMINATING POWER
TO
CLOSE SOLENOID. MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 DIODE OP RPC "C" OUT (12A). P-TERMINAL OF DIODE SHORTS TO
GROUND, ELIMINATING A REDUNDANT PATH FOR THE OPEN SOLENOID POWER.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE VALVE CLOSURE WHILE
SSME'S ARE RUNNING, CAUSING POSSIBLE MPS RUPTURE AND FIRE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]







COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:






















NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




2 MDM (OA2, OA3).
C ]
[ ]
















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




1 POSITIVE INDICATOR SWITCH.
[ ]
[ ]







MPS-5751 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




FALSE OPEN COMMAND DURING ET SEPERATION COULD RESULT IN ET
COLLISION WITH ORBITER DURING SEPERATION IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
LOST.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FALSE OPEN COMMAND DURING ET SEPERATION COULD RESULT IN ET
COLLISION WITH ORBITER DURING SEPERATION IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
LOST.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




FALSE OPEN COMMAND DURING ET SEPERATION COULD RESULT IN ET
COLLISION WITH ORBITER DURING SEPERATION IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
LOST.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POSSIBLE PREMATURE CLOSURE OF VALVE WHILE SSME'S ARE RUNNING.
PRESSURE COULD RUPTURE MPS IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.







MPS-5755 BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




POSSIBLE PREMATURE CLOSURE OF VALVE WHILE SSME'S ARE RUNNING.
PRESSURE COULD RUPTURE MPS IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




POSSIBLE PREMATURE CLOSURE OF VALVE WHILE SSME'S ARE RUNNING.
PRESSURE COULD RUPTURE MPS IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5761























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:





PARALLEL PATH MASKS FAILURE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5762




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
IV] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF VEHICLE IS A POSSIBILITY. PARALLEL PATH MASKS FAILURE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5764
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF VEHICLE IS A POSSIBILITY.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE C /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5765
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF VEHICLE IS A POSSIBILITY.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2242-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COXPARE [ N / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(i%DD/DELETE)




BISTABLE FEATURE, SERIES CONFIGURATION, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5767
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BISTABLE FEATURE, SERIES CONFIGURATION, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HDC FAILING "ON" CANNOT BE DETECTED DUE TO SERIES RPC POWER.
SECOND FAILURE (PREMATURE RPC POWER) WOULD ENERGIZE CLOSE
SOLENOID, BUT BISTABLE FEATURE WOULD KEEP VALVE OPEN.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SERIES CONFIGURATION AND BISTABLE FEATURE PREVENT VALVE CLOSURE
ON A SECOND FAILURE.












MPS-5773 BASELINE [ ]
2245-2 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5773
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HDC FAILING "ON" CANNOT BE DETECTED DUE TO SERIES RPC POWER.
SECOND FAILURE (PREMATURE RPC POWER) WOULD ENERGIZE CLOSE
SOLENOID, BUT BISTABLE FEATURE WOULD KEEP VALVE OPEN.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5774
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BISTABLE FEATURE, SERIES COFIGURATION, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA # : 2243-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 21)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




BISTABLE FEATURE, SERIES COFIGURATION, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2243-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF VEHICLE IS A POSSIBILITY.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2243-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 2249-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE
CLOSE SOLENOID POWER, BUT BISTABLE FEATURE IS REDUNDANT.
PARALLEL PATHS MASK THE FAILURE.







MPS-5778A BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PARALLEL PATHS AND MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] IF] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF 1 POWER PATH TO CLOSE SOLENOID AND
REDUNDANT POWER TO OTHER PATH. REDUNDANT PATHS MASK THE FAILURE.
MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2253-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 ZENER DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA # : 2255-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.









NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 MDMs, OA2 & OA3.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2252-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A SHORT IN THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE COMBINED WITH A SHORT
IN AN INTERNAL HDC DIODE WILL GROUND A SOLENOID. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW ORVEHICLE.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE SERIES CONFIGURATION AND BISTABLE FEATURE PREVENT VALVE
OPENING DUE TO A SECOND FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2246-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 OPEN HDC, TYPE I. THE SERIES CONFIGURATION
AND BISTABLE FEATURE PREVENT VALVE CLOSURE DUE TO A SECOND
FAILURE.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6012
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 CLOSE HDC'S, TYPE III. SERIES CONFIGURATION,
BISTABLE FEATURE, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6012
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SERIES CONFIGURATION, BISTABLE FEATURE, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6013
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SERIES CONFIGURATION, BISTABLE FEATURE, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2243-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N / ] C ] [ ] C ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 CLOSE RPC'S. SERIES CONFIGURATION, BISTABLE
FEATURE, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2242-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN RPC'S. SERIES CONFIGURATION, BISTABLE
FEATURE, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2242-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN RPC'S. SERIES CONFIGURATION, BISTABLE
FEATURE, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2249-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT CLOSE SOLENOID POWER
PATH. SECOND FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE CLOSE SOLENOID POWER, BUT
BISTABLE FEATURE IS REDUNDANT. PARALLEL PATHS MASK THE FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2251-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 CLOSE CROSSOVER DIODE, 12A. PARALLEL PATHS
AND MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2248-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 OPEN RPC B OUTPUT DIODE, 12A. THE SERIES
CONFIGURATION AND BISTABLE FEATURE PREVENT VALVE CLOSURE DUE TO A
SECOND FAILURE.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6014
ISOLATION AND BLOCKING DIODES (6)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 OPEN CROSSOVER DIODE, 12A. BISTABLE FEATURE,
SERIES CONFIGURATION, OR MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 2398-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 CLOSE RPC C OUTPUT DIODE, 12A. FAILURE
CAUSES THE LOSS OF ONE POWER PATH TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID AND
REDUNDANT POWER TO THE OTHER PATH. PARALLEL PATHS MASK THE
FAILURE. MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6014
ISOLATION AND BLOCKING DIODES (6)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 RPC C OUTPUT DIODE, 12A. SECOND FAILURE
WOULD INHIBIT OPEN POWER AND ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST A PREMATURE
CLOSURE.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6015
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (3)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




BISTABLE VALVE AND MECHANICAL LINKAGE PROVIDE REDUNDANCY.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




MECHANICAL LINKAGE WILL PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF MECHANICAL
REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2005-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6021




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 2 MDMS, OAI AND OA3.
[ ]
[ ]




ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-602 IB










NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6021




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 2 POSITION INDICATOR SWITCHES.
[ ]
[ ]














NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6021
POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR LH2 RTLS DUMP
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




A SHORT IN A TRANSIENT DIODE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY. A
SHORT IN AN INTERNAL HDC DIODE WILL GROUND OPEN SOLENOID POWER
AND CLOSE THE VALVE. FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVE COULD CAUSE
OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND RUPTURE DUE TO LH2 BOIL OFF.















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6021




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6021




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-602 IF
NASA FMEA #: 2008-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 2 HDCs, TYPE I. ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA
REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2
MANIFOLD VENT AFTER MECO. OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE COULD
RESULT.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
6022
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 4 HDCs, TYPE III. ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA
REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2
MANIFOLD VENT AFTER MECO. OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE COULD
RESULT.





NASA FMEA #: 2000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[P] [P] [P] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2 MANIFOLD VENT AFTER MECO.
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE COULD RESULT.

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 2 DIODES, A4CR7 AND A4CR8. ONLY AVAIL REF:
MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL PRECLUDE LH2 MANIFOLD VENT AFTER MECO. OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE COULD RESULT.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 2 DIODES, A3CR3 AND A3CR9. ONLY AVAIL REF:
MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL PRECLUDE LH2 MANIFOLD VENT AFTER MECO. OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE COULD RESULT.


















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ 3/3 ] [ P] [ F] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2 MANIFOLD VENT AFTER MECO.
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE COULD RESULT.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /H ]
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6026
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]











NASA FMEA #: N/A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2 MANIFOLD VENT AFTER
MECO. OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE COULD RESULT. FAILURE OF
FAI MAY NOT BE DETECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 200300-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6051






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 7 RESISTORS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2224-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6051






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 HDC, TYPE III.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2224-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6051






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ p] IF] [ P] [ X] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 HDC, TYPE III. PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE
LAUNCH DELAY. IF LAUNCH OCCURS, THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT
ON THE MISSION.












NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6051





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6051






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 POSITION INDICATOR SWITCHES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6051






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COHPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 MDMS, LAI, OAI AND OA2.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR MDM OA3, 3 SIGNAL CONDITIONERS AND 3 PUMP
MOTORS.
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PARALLEL PATHS MASK THE FAILURE.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2038-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURES UNDER ANALYSIS ARE DIFFERENT. THE RECOMMENDATION
CORRESPONDS TO THE MORE CRITICAL FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2038-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2038-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[p] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA'S SCENARIO IS POSSIBLE, BUT IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THREE
WIPERS SHORTING TO GROUND CAN BE CLASSIFIED AS A SINGLE FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2038-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6074
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] C ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 2 FILL AND DRAIN OPEN HDCs ONLY. A SECOND FAILURE
COULD CLOSE THE INBD FILL/DRAIN VALVE DURING LOADING.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6074
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN CLOSE HDC ONLY. FIRST FAILURE
CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. A SECOND FAILURE COULD OPEN THE
VALVE IN FLIGHT.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6074
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TOPPING VALVE OPEN HDC. PRELAUNCH SCENARIO IS
MORE CRITICAL THAN THE DEORBIT SCENARIO.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 FILL AND DRAIN OPEN HDCs. A SECOND FAILURE
WILL NOT CLOSE THE VALVE DURING LOADING (BISTABLE FEATURE).























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN CLOSE HDC. LOSS OF OUTPUT
DETECTED BY V41XI458E.














NASA [ 2 IIR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TOPPING VALVE OPEN HDC. FAILURE IS DETECTED
BY V41XI458E.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. LOSS OF MONITORING
CAPABILITY FOR THE OPEN SWITCH IS THE RESULT OF THE FAILURE.












MPS-6076A BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. NASA FAILURE
SCENARIO WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE EVEN WITHOUT THIS DIODE
FAILURE.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-6076B BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES. FAILURE CAUSES
LOSS OF MONITORING.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES. NASA FAILURE
SCENARIO WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF VEHICLE EVEN WITHOUT THIS DIODE
FAILURE.


















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
(J360). FIRST FAILURE WILL MAKE THE MANUAL OPEN COMMAND TO THE
INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE INOPERABLE.












MPS-6076E BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
(J360). THIS FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
(J359). FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF THE MANUAL OPEN COMMAND.


















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DODE
(J359).











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-6076H BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ HA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE. A LOSS OF ALL
REDUNADANCY COULD VENT H2 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE DURING BOOST. THE
FALURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6076I
2270-2


























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 2271-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TOPPING OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE.












MPS-6076K BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TOPPING OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE. THE
FAILURE NOT DETECTABLE DURING ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 2273-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FA2 MDM BLOCKING DIODE. THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6076M
2273-2







NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] CP] CP]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FA2 MDM BLOCKING DIODE.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2274-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FA3 MDM BLOCKING DIODE. THE FIRST FAILURE
CAUSES A LOSS OF OPEN SOLENOID POWER TO THE INBD FILL/DRAIN
VALVE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FA3 MDM BLOCKING DIODE.
[ ]
[ ]












MPS-6076P BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN FAI MDM BLOCKING DIODE.
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF INBOARD F/D CLOSE SOLENOID POWER.
FIRST














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 FILL AND DRAIN FAI MDM BLOCKING DIODE.
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.
THE

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TOPPING FAI MDM BLOCKING DIODE. THE FIRST
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF OPEN COMMAND FOR THE TOPPING CAUSING IT TO
CLOSE.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6076S
2277-2







NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [p]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-6076T BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. CRITICALITY
3/IR FOR SHORT AND IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.





NASA FMEA #: 2372-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 1.8K SWITCH SCAN BLEED RESISTORS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 202600-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 9 MONITOR RESISTORS.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE VALVE TO OPEN
PREMATURELY.

















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE ARE 3 INDICATORS.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /" ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED B THE LH2 OTBD F/D SW SCAN.
[ ]
[ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AND NASA SCENARIOS ARE DIFFERENT. NASA DEFINES THE FAILURE
AS FAILS TO XFER TO CLOSE. IOA DEFINES THE FAILURE AS FAILURE TO
XFER TO OPEN OR CLOSE. NASA'S ANALYSIS FOR THEIR DEFINITION IS
CORRECT.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL OPEN THE OUTBOARD F/D VALVE. FAILURE OF THE INBOARD
F/D VALVE WILL VENT H2 OVERBOARD DURING BOOST.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PREMATURE SWITCH TRANSFER WILL CLOSE O/B F&D VALVE AND CAUSE LINE
RUPTURE DURING TANK FILL. TYPO ON IOA ANALYSIS SHEET 6083.
FLIGHT CRITICALITY WAS INTENDED TO BE 1/IR FOR SHORT ACROSS CLOSE
CONTACTS, HERE CHANGED TO i/i.
ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6084
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR OPEN HDC ONLY. FILL AND DRAIN VALVE COULD
CLOSE DURING LOADING AFTER A SECOND FAILURE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6084A
2058A-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6084
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR CLOSE HDC ONLY.
[ ]
[ ]























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR OPEN HDC ONLY. THE BISTABLE FEATURE AND THE
INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE OFFER REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE
OPENING.

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR CLOSE HDC ONLY.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2056A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE ONLY. FIRST FAILURE
ELIMINATES THE MANUAL OPEN COMMAND TO THE OUTBOARD FILL/DRAIN
VALVE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR ONE OPEN MDM ISOLATION DIODE.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR ONE CLOSE SWITCH ISOLATION DIODE. fAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTAMINATION OF THE MPS SYSTEM DURING ENTRY, BUT IS
NOT CRITICAL.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR ONE CLOSE MDM ISOLATION DIODE. FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTABLE DURING ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 2360A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 5.1K MONITORING RESISTORS.
[ ]
[ ]





















[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)












NASA FMEA #: 2013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT COULD
SHORT THE SOLENOID TO GROUND WITH ANOTHER FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2014-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 MONITOR RESISTOR, 5.1K.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2015-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 RPC BLEED RESISTORS, 1.8K.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2016-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 RPC LIMIT RESISTORS, 2.2K.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6102
2061-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6102




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INSTRUMENTATION WILL DETECT THE FAILURE.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6102A
2061-2
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6102




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE I142 FEEDLINE RELIEF VALVE OFFERS REDUNDANCY AFTER A PREMATURE
OPENING OF THE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :




THE ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NOMINAL USE OF SWITCH. THE ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.





NASA FMEA #: 2060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C



























NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6106




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
C ]
[ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ]. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES. FAILURE CAUSES
LOSS OF CLOSED SWITCH SCAN.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C






ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. FAILURE CAUSES LOSS
OF OPEN SWITCH SCAN.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
C ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 MDM TO RPC BLOCKING DIODES.
[ 3
[ 3













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 MDM TO RPC BLOCKING DIODES. A SHORT WILL NOT
CAUSE A HAZARD TO CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 MDM TO HDC BLOCKING DIODE. PARALLEL PATHS
MASK THE FAILURE.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CP] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 MDM TO HDC BLOCKING DIODE. FAILURE CREATES
NO HAZRDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FEEDLINE RELIEF VALVE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY AGAINST H2 ESCAPING
INTO THE ATMOSPHERE.



















NEW C X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 RPC CROSSOVER DIODE. THE FEEDLINE RELIEF
VALVE OFFERS ADDITIONAL REDUNDANCY AGAINST ALLOWING H2 TO ESCAPE
INTO THE ATMOSPHERE.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 RPC A OUTPUT DIODE. THE LH2 RELIEF VALVE
PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.











MDM (FA1, FA3, FA4)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE PARALLEL CONFIGURATION WILL NOT ALLOW A SECOND FAILURE TO
CLOSE TWO VALVES.

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COS?ARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(AD D/DE LETE )






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SECOND FAILURE WILL NOT CLOSE TWO FLOW CONTROL VALVES.





NASA FMEA #: 201100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6131






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
I" / ] r ] I: ] i: ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2405-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6131






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2406-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6131






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA ANALYSIS IS CORRECT EXCEPT THAT MECHANICAL BACKUP ADDS AN
ADDITIONAL LAYER OF REDUNDANCY.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6142
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2)
MCNI COLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [






ASSESSMENT FOR OPEN HDC ONLY. IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CLOSE HDC
AND IGNORED THE MECHANICAL BACKUP.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
6142
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REF: FMEA NO. 05-6J-2101-i REV. 10/10/87 ANALYZES BOTH THE
NOMINAL AND ABORT CASES. THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE NOMINAL
CASE. THE CRITICALITY i/I FOR AN ENGINE OUT ABORT IS CORRECT.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6143




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES COMBINED WITH A SHORT IN AN INTERNAL
HDC DIODE WILL ELIMINATE SOLENOID POWER. A FAILURE OF MECHANICAL
BACKUP TO CLOSE THE DISCONNECT VALVE DURING ET
SEPARATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 13 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-6151 BASELINE [ ]
2222-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6151




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6151




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 2223-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-6151C BASELINE [ ]
2394-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6151




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2197-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE SWITCH IS NOT USED DURING NOMINAL OPERATIONS.
[ ]
[ ]


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE SWITCH IS NOT USED DURING NOMINAL OPERATIONS.
[ ]
[ ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE NASA SCENARIO IS MORE CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CP] CP] CP]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE NASA SCENARIO IS MORE CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6154
2199-1






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE).




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 OPEN RPCs (36 & 40).
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6154
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 OPEN RPCs (36 & 40).
C ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COXPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6154
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 CLOSE RPCs (#35 & 39).
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6154




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 CLOSE RPCs (#35 & 39).
[ ]
[ ]













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6155
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I (6)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN HDCs. TELEMETRY FROM THE SERIES RPC
WOULD DETECT THE FAILURE.












MPS-6155A BASELINE [ ]
22Ol-2 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6155
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I (6)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN HDCs. TELEMETRY FROM THE SERIES RPC
WOULD DETECT THE FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2203-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE HDCs. TELEMETRY FROM THE SERIES RPC
WOULD DETECT THE FAILURE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6155




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If ifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE HDCs. TELEMETRY FROM THE SERIES RPC
WOULD DETECT THE FAILURE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6156
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 OPEN HDCs.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-6156B BASELINE [ ]
2204-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6156
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 CLOSE HDCs.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-6156C BASELINE [ ]
2204-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6156




[ P ] [ F ]
[P] IF]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 CLOSE HDCs.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES.
C ]
C ]

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN RPC CROSSOVER DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE COMMAND A RPC OUTOUT DIODES.


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE RPC CROSSOVER DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MPS-6157D
2392-1
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
6157



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES.
[ ]
[ 1

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










fromRECOMMENDATIONS: (If different NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES.












MPS-6158 BASELINE [ ]
2209-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
6158
ISOLATION DIODES, 4.2A (3)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES. TYPO IN ITEM NAME:
MDAC 6158 COVERED 30 DIODES, NOT 3. INSTRUMENTATION FOR THE
SERIES RPC WILL DETECT THE FAILURE.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES. TELEMETRY FROM
THE SERIES RPC CAN DETECT THE FAILURE.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] IF] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






THE DIODE PROVIDES REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD PREMATURELY CLOSE THE PREVALVE.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE SWITCH COMMAND A BLOCKING DIODES.
FAILURE ERODES THE REDUNDANCY OF AN UNUSED SWITCH.
THE

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 9 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. FAILURE CAUSES A
LOSS IN MONITORING CAPABILITIES.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 9 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES. THE FAILURE CAUSES
A LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITIES.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IDA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES.
C ]
C ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 MAINSTAGE BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ 1














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN SWITCH COMMAND C BLOCKING DIODES.
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS IN REDUNDANCY FOR THE MANUAL OPEN COMMAND.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN SWITCH COMMAND B BLOCKING DIODES.
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR THE MANUAL OPEN COMMAND.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] IF] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 CLOSE SWITCH B&C BLOCKING DIODES. THE
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS IN REDUNDANCY FOR THE MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. THE FAILURE
CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR THE MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [F] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE
DIODE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF OPEN SOLENOID POWER. A LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CLOSE THE PREVALVE DURING ENGINE BURN RESULTING
IN AN EXPLOSION.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2113-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ _ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE RPC'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM PURGE IN AN
SSME.





NASA FMEA #: 2113-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE RPC'S.
MAKE HELIUM LEAK ISOLATION IMPOSSIBLE.
THE AFT COMPARTMENT AND CAUSE DAMAGE.
A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY COULD
THIS COULD OVERPRESSURIZE





NASA FMEA #: 2375-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2379-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [











NASA FMEA #: 2379-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]
EPD_C/MPS
7100







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE FUSES. IOA SHOWS 3/IR FOR ABORT
ONLY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO
LACK OF HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME. THE FAILURE IS MASKED BY
PARALLEL PATHS.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 "A" VALVE FUSES. IOA INDICATES 3/IR FOR
ABORTS ONLY. ONLY AVAILREF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY
8/17/87. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE
TO LACK OF HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF
HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.












MPS-7120A BASELINE [ ]
2117-3 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7120
TOGGLE SWITCH, IP3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REF; MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF
HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.












MPS-7120B BASELINE [ ]
2117-4 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7120
TOGGLE SWITCH, IP3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REF; MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF
HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.












MPS-7130 BASELINE [ ]
2111-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7130
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.












MPS-7130A BASELINE [ ]
2111-3 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7130
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME. THE FAILURE MAY NOT BE DETECTED.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD MAKE HELIUM LEAK ISOLATION
IMPOSSIBLE. THIS COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT AND
CAUSE DAMAGE.
















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF
HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7140
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAILABLE REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD MAKE HELIUM LEAK ISOLATION IMPOSSIBLE.
THIS COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT AND CAUSE DAMAGE.




















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[P] IF]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE RPC OUTPUT DIODES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM
PURGE IN AN SSME.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE RPC OUTPUT DIODES. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM
PURGE IN AN SSME.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. IOA
INDICATES 3/IR FOR ABORTS ONLY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM PURGE IN AN SSME.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. ONLY
AVAILABLE REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM
PURGE IN AN SSME.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. ONLY
AVAILABLE REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM
PURGE IN AN SSME.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
7190




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
7191




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7200





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FME #: 2148-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7200






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FME #: 2149-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7200






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ 3 [ ] [ 3 [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2147-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7200






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 9 DIODES. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION (INTACT
ABORT). NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 2148-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7200






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT FOR 9 DIODES. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION (INTACT
ABORT). NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE [LOSS OF
MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES
ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR. THE FAILURE WOULD BE CRITICALITY IR FOR AN
ABORT. ONLY AVAIL. REF.: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87.












MPS-7220 BASELINE [ ]
2141-4 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7220
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2R ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS
WILL CREATE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT. ONLY AVAILABLE REFERENCE:
MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2R ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF
MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. THE SWITCH IS STANDBY
REDUNDANT. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR. ONLY
AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2141-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS
WILL CREATE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT. ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA
REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2141-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF
MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES
ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR. THE SWITCH IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. ONLY AVAIL
REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF
MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES
ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR. THE FAILURE WOULD BE CRITICALITY IR FOR AN
ABORT. ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF
MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES
ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR. THE CRITICALITY WOULD BE IR FOR AN ABORT.
ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7240
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6)
EMMONS/MCNEEL¥
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NASA CALLS LOSS OF AN UNRELATED ENGINE A REDUNDANT FAILURE.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA CALLS THE LOSS OF AN UNRELATED ENGINE A REDUNDANT FAILURE.
ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMAMRY 8-17-87.












MPS-7260 BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 DIODES. ONLY AVAIL REF: FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY
8-17-87. THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. THE
FAILURE WILL NOT BE DETECTED. RESULTS IN LOSS OF
MISSION (INTACT ABORT). NSTS 22206 REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.












MPS-7260A BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. THE
FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED. RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION (INTACT
ABORT). NSTS 22206 REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.











MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




SECOND FAILURE CAN CAUSE AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION
(INTACT ABORT). NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/1R.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
7271







[ 3 [ ]













(If different from NASA)
] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2153-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2403-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2404-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2151-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FME #: 2150-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEAREVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. THE
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF MISSION)
IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES
ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 2150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. NO
HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 2151-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. THE
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF MISSION)
IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES
ASSIGNMENT OF 3/1R.





NASA FMEA #: 2404-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300






HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IDENTICAL FAILURE SCENARIO AS NASA FMEA 2148-2, BUT NASA's TWO
FMEAs DISAGREE. THE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE
ENGINE (LOSS OF MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST. NSTS 22206
2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 2303-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH (OPEN) SCAN DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2304-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH (CLOSED) SCAN DIODES.
C ]
[ ]











ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH (CLOSED) SCAN DIODES. THE FAILURE OF
THE ITEMS WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 2305-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P] IF] [P] IX]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 MDM BLOCKING DIODES. THE FAILURE OF THE
ITEMS WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 2305-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 MDM BLOCKING DIODES.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2306-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [ P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. FAILURE TO OPEN
VALVES IS NON-CRITICAL TO A NOMINAL FLIGHT. THE CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR AN ABORT.





NASA FMEA #: 2306-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. FAILURE TO OPEN
VALVES IS NON-CRITICAL TO A NOMINAL FLIGHT. THE CRITICALITY IS
3/IR FOR AN ABORT.





NASA FMEA #: 2307-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. THE
CRITICALITY FOR A SHORT IS 3/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 2308-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 4 MONITOR RESISTORS.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2414-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 BLEED RESISTOR.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2134-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7420
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 2134-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7420
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7420
PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE POWER








NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2137-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7420
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2138-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7420
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2139-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7420
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2131-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7430
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE SWITCH IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2131-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7430
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. THE
SWITCH IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 2130-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7440
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT FUSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.








NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7450
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT ISOLATION DIODES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ _A] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. FAILURE
OF THE BLOCKING DIODE FOR THE SWITCH WOULD NOT BE DETECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 2132-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7460
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE
FAILURE WOULD PREVENT VALVE OPENING.















HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES AND 2 MONITORING
RESISTORS. CRITICALITY FOR THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES FOR
A SHORT DURING AN ABORT IS 3/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 2371-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES AND 2 MONITORING
RESISTORS. CRITICALITY FOR THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES FOR
A SHORT DURING AN ABORT IS 3/IR.





NASA FMEA #: 2050-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7480
ITEM: HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE SECOND FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM AVAILABLE FOR
LO2 DUMP.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR MDMs FA3 AND FA4. THE SECOND FAILURE WILL
RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM AVAILABLE FOR LO2 DUMP.





NASA FMEA #: 2317-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 DIODES AND 5 RESISTORS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2314-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 2314-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. THE FAILURE DOES
ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION ALLOWING THE NASA SCENARIO TO
OCCUR.





NASA FMEA #: 2316-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2316-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [ F] [ P] IX] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. THE FAILURE
DOES ELIMINATE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY ALLOWING THE NASA SCENARIO TO
OCCUR.





NASA FMEA #: 2317-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2315-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2318-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2324-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COHPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7500




[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2313-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7510
ITEM: LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FAILURE WILL PREVENT REPRESSURIZATION FOR LANDING, BUT COULD
NOT CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.





NASA FMEA # : N/A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR MDM FA3 AND FA4. ASSESSMENT FOR FAILS ON
RATHER THAN FAILS OFF.





NASA FMEA #: 2312-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL C_RCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE WILL NOT PRECLUDE LO2 DUMP.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2322-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









NASA FMEA #: 2319-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2319-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. ONLY AVAIL REF:
MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. A SECOND FAILURE WOULD NOT
ALLOW HELIUM INGESTION INTO THE SSME's, BUT A THIRD FAILURE
WOULD.





NASA FMEA #: 2321-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LHa MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2321-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. ONLY AVAIL REF:
MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87. THE FAILURE WILL ERODE
BLOCKING PROTECTION IN THE OPEN SOLENOID POWER MATH. A LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE HELIUM INGESTION INTO THE SSME's.





NASA FMEA #: 2322-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2320-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2323-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)












NASA FMEA #: 2325-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA # : 2065-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7550
ITEM: LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE HELIUM INGESTION INTO THE SSME's
DURING BURN.





NASA FMEA #: N/A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]
COMPARE C N /N ] C N ] C N ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FIRST FAILURE WILL OPEN BOTH SOLENOIDS CAUSING HELIUM
INGESTION INTO THE SSME's.





NASA FMEA # : 2019-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 2019-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2020-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2021-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA # : 2022-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FME #: 2049-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







1/42 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2382-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2382-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLDRTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2383-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 2383-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 2018-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES REMOTE POWER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: 2048-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7600
ITEM: LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87.





NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES MDM COMMANDS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ N ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















































































































PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE
PNEU HE SUPPLY FILTER
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPP
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA







4.7 CU. FT. HELIUM SU





ENGINE HE RELIEF VALV
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALV
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALV
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALV
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALV
ENGINE REGULATOR OUTL
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOL
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOL
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATI
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATI
L02 PREVALVE PNEU ACC


























FAILS TO CLOSE. 0
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE







FAILS OUT OF TOLE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE (R
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE (R
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
PREMATURE ACTUATI
FAILS TO REMAIN 0









































































































LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
L02 INBOARD FILL VALV
L02 INBOARD FILL VALV
L02 INBOARD FILL VALV

















LH2 REPLENISH VALVE 0
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE 0
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE 0
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VA
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE. F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE_ F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F







































































































HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VA
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VA
PNEUMATIC HE FILL LIN
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPP
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATI
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATI
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
L02 POGO ACCUM RECIRC
L02 POGO ACCUM RECIRC
L02 POGO ACCUM RECIRC
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED V
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED V
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED V
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED V
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOAR
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOAR
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTL
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTL
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTL
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS R
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTL
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS R
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTL
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VA
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VA
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPP
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HE FILL LIN
ENGINE HELIUM LINE (C
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE
17.3 CU. FT. HELIUM S




FAILS TO CLOSE, F







FAILS TO REMAIN O
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW,
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
RESTRICTED FLOW,
FAILS TO OPEN, EX




FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN






FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN C
FAILS TO OPEN






























































































































LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VAL
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALV
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALV
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALV




L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOAR





L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
L02 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOAR
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED V
FAILS TO OPEN OR














FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
RUPTURE, LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO OPEN, EX









































































































LH2 INBOARD FILL VALV
VALVE ACTUATION SOLEN
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALV
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & D
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 GROUND FILL & DRA
LH2 GROUND FILL AND D
L02 FILL AND DRAIN DI
LH2 FILL & DRAIN DISC
L02 GROUND FILL & DRA
LH2 GROUND FILL AND D
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (
L02 FILL & DRAIN LINE
L02 FILL & DRAIN LINE
L02 FILL & DRAIN LINE





L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 INBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN O
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE T
FAILS TO REMAIN O
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE O
FAIL TO REMAIN CL
FAIL TO RELIEVE




FAIL TO REMAIN CL
FAIL TO OPEN





FAIL TO REMAIN OP




FAIL TO REMAIN OP
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE 0













FAILS TO REMAIN C
FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAILS TO OPEN. FA
FAILS TO OPEN, FA
RELIEF VALVE FAIL
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO REMAIN C







































































































L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND
L02 PREVALVE (PVI, 2,
L02 PREVALVE (PV1, 2,
L02 PREVALVE (PV1, 2,
L02 PREVALVE (PVI, 2,
L02 PREVALVE (PVI, 2,
L02 PREVALVE (PV1, 2,
L02 PREVALVE (PV11 2,
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PV5
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5,
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PV5
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PV5













L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT V
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS
L02 FEED DISCONNECT (
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS
D-7
FAILS TO OPEN, FA





FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE_ F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F




FAIL TO OPEN, FAI
FAIL TO OPEN, FAI
ERRONEOUS INDICAT
FAIL TO RELIEVE






FAIL TO REMAIN OP
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO CLOSE, FA
ERRONEOUS INDICAT
CAVITY FAILS TO R
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F





FAIL TO OPEN, FAI
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LOSS OF POSITION
FAIL TO CLOSE, FA




FAILS TO OPEN, FA








































































































L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DIS








L02 FEED MANIFOLD REL
LO2 FEED MANIFOLD REL
L02 FEED MANIFOLD REL
L02 FEED MANIFOLD REL
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE
L02 17 INCH FEEDLINE
L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE
L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE
LH2 PRESTARTCONDITIO
L02 BLEED LINE, 1.5"
LH2 RELIEF LINE (FROM








L02 BLEED RECIRC & PO
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LI
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LI
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VA
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VA
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VA
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VA
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (0
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (0
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (0
LH2 HI POINT BLEED DI
LH2 HI POINT BLEED DI
LOSS OF POSITION
FAILS TO CLOSE_F







FAIL TO OPEN (REL
EXTERNALLEAKAGE
FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAILS TO REMAIN C
EXTERNALLEAKAGE
EXTERNALLEAKAGE































FAIL TO REMAIN CL








































































































LO2 DELTA PRESSURE LI





LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF F
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF F






LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VAL
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VAL
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VAL
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VAL
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VAL





L02 AND LH2 FEED DISC
L02 AND LH2 FEED DISC
L02 AND LH2 FEED DISC
L02 AND LH2 FEED DISC
L02 AND LH2 FEED DISC
L02 AND LH2 FEED DISC
L02 RELIEF LINE, I" D
L02 RELIEF SENSE LINE
L02 RELIEF SENSE LINE
LH2 LINE ASSEMBLY (PD
L02 LINE ASSEMBLY (PD










FAIL TO OPEN (REL
FAIL TO REMAIN CL
FAIL TO REMAIN CL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OPEN, FAI




FAILS TO OPEN, FA
FAILS TO OPEN, FA
FAILS TO OPEN, FA
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN, FA
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FA
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE 0
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO RELIEVE
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
FAIL TO REMAIN LO
FAIL TO UNLOCK PO
FAIL TO REMAIN UN
LOSS OF POSITION
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE 0













































































































LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE
LH2 RELIEF LINE (RV6
LH2 RELIEF SENSE LINE
LH2 RELIEF SENSE LINE
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-P
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-P
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-P
LH2 PRE-PRESS CHECK V

























L02 ULLAGE PRESSURE S
LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE S
LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE S
L02 ULLAGE PRESSURE S





L02 TANK PRE-PRESS (0
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS (0
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (0
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CH
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CH






FAIL TO CLOSE, FA
FAIL TO CLOSE. FA
FAIL TO CLOSE_ FA
FAIL TO CLOSE (RE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OPEN_ FAI
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO CLOSEr FA
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OPEN, FAI
FAIL TO CLOSEr FA
CLOGGED FLOW PATH
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE










FAILS TO CLOSE. F
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN_ FA











FAILS TO CLOSEr F
FAILS TO REMAIN C
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE. F
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE







































































































GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CON
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CON
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CON
G02 PRESSURE FLOW CON






L02 MANIF REPRESS REG
L02 MANIFOLD REPRESSU
L02 MANIF REPRESS REG
L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS
L02 FEED MANIFOLD REP




L02 SENSE LINE (PDI T






LH2 FEED MANIFOLD DIS
L02 ENGINE INLET TEMP
G02 ENGINE OUTLET TEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (P
LH2 MANIF REPRESS REG
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD NOM
G02 PRESSURIZATION MA
LH2 RECIRCULATION MAN
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VA





LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOAR
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOAR
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOAR
LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (P








FAILS TO CLOSE, F
FAILS TO OPEN, EX
FAILS TO CLOSE, F





























FAIL TO CLOSE, FA
FAIL TO CLOSE, FA
FAIL TO OPEN, FAI
FAIL TO OPEN, FAI
























































































































POWER & CONTROL CIRCU
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF S
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA,
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF I
HYBRID DRIVER. TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER_ TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER. TYPE 3
HDC - GND C/O COMMAND
HDC I-GND C/O CMD PWR
BUS 2 AND 3 UPSTREAM





HDC, RELAY CONTROL PO
HDC I-RELAY CONTROL P
HDC, RELAY CONTROL PO






G02 PRESSURE FLOW CON
BLOCKING DIODE
G02 PRESSURE FLOW CON
TOGGLE SWITCH
L02 INBOARD FILL & DR
L02 INBOARD FILL & DR
L02 INBOARD FILL & DR




















LOSS OF OUTPUT, E
FUSE FAIL OPEN (I
FUSE FAIL OPEN (I
FUSE FAIL ON (ACT






































































































































HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3









HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS
LH2 MANIFOLDREPRESS






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
CLOSE HDC III














































FUSE FAIL OPEN (I














































































































HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
OPEN HDC I
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
CL HDC III
CL HDC III
































VALVE POWER AND CONTR
VALVE POWER AND CONTR
L02 PROPELLENT DUMP S
L02 PROPELLENT DUMP S
DUMP SEQUENCE SWITCH
BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWIT
BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWIT
BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWIT
FUSE FAIL OPEN (I
FAIL ON (FALSE OP
FAIL ON (FALSE OP
FAIL OFF (INHIBIT
INADVERTENT OUTPU
FUSE FAIL OPEN (I
FUSE FAIL OPEN (I
PREMATURE OUTPUT
PREMATURE OUTPUT


















OPEN, FAILS TO CO














FAIL OPEN (DUMP I
SHORTS (PREMATURE
PREMATURE XFER TO












































































































DIODE (i0 PER CIRCUIT
DIODE (2 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (10 PER CIRCUIT
DIODE (6 PER CIRCUIT>
DIODE (I0 PER CIRCUIT
DIODE (3 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (i0 PER CIRCUIT
DIODE (7 PER CIRCUIT)
L02 PREVALVECONTROL
DIODE (I0 PER CIRCUIT
DIODE (7 PER CIRCUIT)
L02 PREVALVECONTROL
OPENSWITCH BLOCKING
DIODE (10 PER CIRCUIT
DIODE (b PER CIRCUIT)
CLOSESWITCH BLOCKING
L02 PREVALVECONTROL
DIODE (I0 PER CIRCUIT
























































FAIL OPEN. FAIL C




FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
FAIL OPEN. FAIL S
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S






















































































































LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE SW
ISOLATION DIODE (36)
LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SW
LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SW
LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE S
LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SW
LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SW
LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE S
ALL ECO SIM OPEN CMD
ALL ECO SIM DRY CMD H
ECO SIM WET CMD 1-4 H
LVL SENSOR SIM DRY CM
LVL SENSOR SIM WET CM
RPC OUTPUT DIODE
RPC OUTPUT DIODE













HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
OPEN HDC, TYPE III (2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
CLOSE HDC, TYPE III (
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT
ISOLATION AND BLOCKIN






































FAIL ON (FALSE OP





FAIL ON (FALSE CL













































































































DIODE, CLOSE RPC B OU









DIODE (12A), CL XOVER
DIODE, CLOSING CROSSO
DIODE (12A), CL XOVER
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT










HIGH POINT OPEN HDC (
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL
FUSE, IA (3)
FILL AND DRAIN OPEN S











HIGH POINT LAI MDM BL
ISOLATION DIODES (16)
DIODE (2), OPEN SW BL
DIODE (3A) (4)
DIODE (3A) (4)

































FAIL OPEN. FAIL S
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
FAIL OPEN. FAIL S
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
SHORT
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
OPEN




















































































































LOCK HDC III (2)
LOCK HDC Ill (2)
LOCK HDC III (2)





LOCK RPC C OUTPUTDIO
LOCK RPC C OUTPUTDIO
LOCK RPC C OUTPUTDIO
























L02 OUTBOARDFILL & D
LOCK RPC B OUTPUTDIO
LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIO
LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIO
LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIO
UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT D
UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT D
UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT D
UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT D




























































































































































LH2 PREVALVES OPEN CO
ISOLATION DIODES, 12A
LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE C
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA,
RPC A OUTPUT DIODE
RPC A OUTPUT DIODE, 1
ISOLATION AND BLOCKIN
DIODE, CLOSE RPC C OU
DIODE CL RPC "C" OUT
DIODE (12A)
ISOLATION AND BLOCKIN
DIODE, OPEN RPC C OUT
DIODE (12A)
VALVE POWER AND CONTR
MPS INSTRUMENT POWER
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CH
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT M
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT M
MDM LA1






PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOL
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VA














































FAILS TO REMAIN 0



































LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (P
FAIL OPEN
FAILS OPEN, INADV
FAIL OPEN, FAIL S
FAILS ON (PREMATU
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
D-20


